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Abstract
People often form expectations about others using the lens of their own atti-
tudes (the so-called consensus effect). We study the implications of this for trust
and trustworthiness in an evolutionary model where social preferences are endoge-
nous. Trustworthy individuals are more “optimistic” than opportunists and are
accordingly less afraid to engage in market-based exchanges, where they may be
vulnerable to cheating. Depending on the distribution of social preferences in the
population, the material benefits from greater participation may compensate for
the costs of being trustworthy. By providing an explicit account of how individuals
form and revise their beliefs, we are able to show the existence of a polymorphic
equilibrium where both trustworthiness and opportunism coexist in the population.
We also analyze the effect of enforcement, distinguishing between its role as de-
terrence of future misbehavior and as retribution for past misbehavior. We show
that enforcement aimed at deterring opportunistic behavior has ambiguous effects
on social preferences. It may favor the spreading of trustworthiness (crowding in),
but the opposite (crowding out) may also occur. By contrast, crowding out never
occur when punishment is merely intended as retribution.
Jel Codes: A13, C73, D02, D03, D82, Z1.
Keywords: Endogenous Preferences, Trust, Consensus Effect, Deterrence, Ret-
ribution, Crowding Out.
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1 Introduction
People tend to think that others are like them. Nice guys tend to think that others
are nice, while crooks believe that other people have similarly shifty personalities. This
consensus effect has long been recognized by psychologists, at least since the seminal
paper by Ross et al. (1977). Economists have also increasingly started to document and
to pay attention to this phenomenon.1
The aim of this work is to study the implications of the consensus effect for the
long-term evolution of preferences. We consider a setup where individuals either have
preferences that only reflect their selfish material welfare (Opportunists) or have other-
regarding/principled preferences (Unselfish). People are randomly matched to play a trust
game in which trusting is optimal only when one’s counterparty is unselfish. However,
individual preferences are private information, and, thus, players decide to trust or not
based on their (possibly heterogenous) beliefs about the composition of the overall popu-
lation. Endowed with this setup, we use an indirect evolutionary approach (see Gu¨th and
Yaari, 1992) to ask what distributions of preferences are likely to arise in the long run.
Previous work has already established that, when preferences are unobservable, the
Unselfish type may be adaptive provided that beliefs about the population are type depen-
dent. In particular, Orbell and Dawes (1991) suggest that, if unselfish individuals have a
higher propensity to believe that others are unselfish, they will be more inclined to interact
with others. Depending on the actual composition of the population, higher participation
propensity may afford an advantage to the Unselfish type which may compensate for the
cost of foregoing lucrative opportunities for expropriating others (a cost which is borne
by the Unselfish but not by the Opportunists). This implies that the Unselfish type is not
necessarily outperformed by the Opportunists and can thus be evolutionarily successful.
Gamba (2013) provides a related argument.
These accounts for the survival of other-regarding preferences – Orbell and Dawes’s
(1991), Gamba’s (2013) – are appealing because they do not rely on preferences being
observable. This stands in contrast with most of the literature on the indirect evolutionary
approach.2 On the other hand, these models predict that those with unselfish preferences
1Experimental studies by economists include Selten and Ockenfels (1998), Engelmann and Strobel
(2000, 2012), Sapienza et al. (2010), Blanco at al. (2009, 2011), Ga¨chter et al. (2010), Costa-Gomes et
al. (2010) and Ellingsen et al. (2010).
2See e.g., Robson (1990). An exception to this is Huck and Oechssler (1998), who consider a setup
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will strictly outperform the Opportunists whenever their share of the population is above
some critical value. Any payoff monotone dynamics would thus necessarily lead to a
monomorphic population. As a result, these theories fail to account for the considerable
heterogeneity in behavior extensively documented by the experimental literature. Indeed,
as argued by Samuelson (2005)
“Perhaps one of the most robust findings to emerge from experimental
economics is that (..) heterogeneity is widespread and substantial. Despite
this, heterogeneity has often not played a prominent role in many theoretical
models.”
Our paper advances the literature in two respects. First, the consensus effect is ex-
plicitly derived from rational belief formation based on introspection, as in Dawes (1989)
and subsequent literature (Goeree and Großer, 2006, and Vanberg, 2008). Second, we
let players observe an external signal on the distribution of preferences in the population
before playing. The combination of these two elements generates our key result, namely
that a polymorphic population (where unselfish and opportunistic preferences coexist)
may be stable. In our framework, heterogeneity emerges endogenously, as an equilibrium
feature. Our theoretical analysis is thus one of the few to account for heterogeneity in
behavior.3
In a nutshell, the key forces in our model can be described as follows. Consider
an environment where, thanks to higher participation propensity, the Unselfish type is
(initially) more successful than the Opportunistic type. As the proportion of unselfish
individuals increases, the risk of being cheated is reduced. This effect increases the fitness
of the Unselfish (who have a higher propensity to trust) more than that of the Oppor-
tunists. There are however countervailing forces that set a natural upper bound to the
share of unselfish individuals. As the Unselfish type spreads, all players (including the
Opportunists) become more likely to observe objective evidence suggesting that trust-
ing is indeed optimal. The Opportunists become accordingly more willing to trust and,
consequently, participation propensities become less type-dependent. At the same time,
where preferences are unobservable. However, in their setup players observe the composition of the
population from which the opponent is drawn.
3Stable polymorphisms of both altruistic and selfish individuals may arise in models with local inter-
actions. See Cohen and Eshel (1976) and Eshel et al. (1998). The mechanism at work in these models is
very different from ours.
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higher participation rates (of both types) increase the scope for cheating, thus boosting
the Opportunists’ fitness. In essence, the very prevalence of unselfish individuals un-
dermines their evolutionary advantage. This results in a stable polymorphic population
where unselfish individuals do materially as well as opportunistic ones.
Although quite intuitive, these effects can only be captured through an explicit account
of how players form and revise their (type dependent) beliefs. In this paper, we focus
on the true consensus effect, which is consistent with Bayesian learning and a common
prior.4 This is obtained by relaxing the standard assumption that the distribution of types
within a population is known by the players. When the distribution of types is unknown,
it becomes rational for individuals to use their own types to make inferences about the
overall population. This is precisely what happens in our setup; the share of unselfish
individuals in the population is not perfectly observed and, hence, the (Bayesian) beliefs
about the composition of the overall population are type-dependent.5
The second contribution of our paper focuses on the interaction between ethical at-
titudes and institutions aimed at sanctioning/preventing opportunistic behavior. In par-
ticular, we consider the extreme cases of external punishment purely aimed at deterring
opportunistic behavior and that of punishment intended as mere retribution for past mis-
behavior. We find that deterrence always increases welfare in the short run (i.e. keeping
the distribution of types fixed), but has ambiguous long term effects (when the distribu-
tion of types is endogenous). In the long term, deterrence makes participation decisions
more similar across types, thus crowding out other regarding preferences.6 For some
parameter values, this may lead to more cheating and lower welfare. Retribution has
4While the importance of the consensus effect is well established, its interpretation is more contro-
versial. Some psychologists claim that people systematically overestimate the extent to which others are
similar to them – the so-called “false consensus effect”. Others – such as Dawes (1989), Goeree and
Großer (2006) or Vanberg (2008) – argue that this tendency is compatible with a common prior and
Bayesian learning – hence, the terminology “true consensus effect”.
5Type-dependent beliefs also feature in Ellingsen and Johanneson (2008). In Adriani and Sonderegger
(2009) the consensus effect arises as an equilibrium feature of a game where parents select the values to
instil in their children.
6See e.g. Frey (1997) and Be´nabou and Tirole (2003) for theoretical analyses of motivation crowding
out, and Frey and Jegen (2001) for a survey of empirical evidence. Huck (1998) and Bar-Gill and
Fershtman (2004 and 2005) build models where, as in ours, preferences are derived endogenously and
may be “crowded out” in the long-run by the institutional environment. However, the mechanisms at
work are very different from ours.
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somewhat opposite effects: it entails welfare costs in the short run (since the welfare of
cheaters is reduced), but generates a more desirable distribution of preferences in the long
run.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. Section 3
characterizes the equilibrium in the stage game. In Section 4 we analyze the long term
distribution of preferences. Section 5 focuses on the effects of deterrence and retribution.
Section 6 briefly discusses possible extensions. Further details are provided in the working
paper version.7 Finally, Section 7 concludes by assessing the evidence on the relationship
between trustworthiness, trust, and socioeconomic outcomes.
2 The Model
2.1 The stage game
Principals (P ) We consider a sequential game where a risk neutral individual (the prin-
cipal) must decide whether to participate in an exchange with another individual (the
agent) who may engage in opportunistic behavior. To fix ideas, suppose that the prin-
cipal is a buyer and the agent is the seller. The agent can behave opportunistically by
delivering a damaged good or by not delivering at all. If the principal chooses not to
participate (np), she will save her money and obtain a material welfare normalized to
zero. If the principal chooses to participate (p) and the agent does not cheat (nc), the
principal will obtain θ > 0. In contrast, if the agent cheats (c), the principal suffers a loss
−α, with α > 0. Hence, in this latter case, the principal would have been better off not
participating in the exchange at all.8 The material payoffs of the game are summarized
in Figure 1. We assume away all issues of reputation and concentrate on the case in
which the agent is a complete stranger, randomly drawn from the population, and the
principal-agent interaction is one-shot.
7Available at sites.google.com/site/fabrizioadriani/Home/research.
8Orbell and Dawes (1991) consider a sequential game where individuals choose whether or not to
participate in a prisoners’ dilemma game. The sequential game we use is simpler since the participation
decision (trust/not) is built into the game. It is also clear that many of our results are not confined to
the simple game we use. Other possible applications include the ultimatum game and the gift exchange
game (see Section 7).
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Figure 1: Material payoff game
Agents (A) If the principal chooses not to participate, the agent receives a material payoff
equal to zero. When the principal participates, the agent obtains a payoff normalized to
one if he does not cheat and a payoff equal to 1 + ρ, ρ > 0, if he cheats. The agent’s
material welfare is thus maximized by cheating whenever trusted. We assume ρ < θ + α
– i.e. cheating is inefficient. In the buyer/seller example, the buyer may derive higher
material welfare from consumption of the good, so that more surplus is generated if the
good ends up in the buyer’s hands rather than in those of the seller.
Preference Traits We assume that individuals may be of two types: Opportunistic (O)
and Unselfish (U). Type O individuals only care about material welfare. In contrast with
type O, type U individuals have other regarding preferences. We will focus here on the
simplest possible form of other regarding preferences. In particular, we will assume that
type U are altruistic and maximize the sum of their own material welfare and that of their
counterparty. In the working paper version of this paper we show that our results are
compatible with a variety of other regarding motives including reciprocity and homophily.9
9Empirical studies on deception (Gneezy, 2005) suggest that the propensity to cheat varies with the
stakes. While we do not incorporate this effect in our model, it might provide an additional channel
through which introspection may help unselfish individuals. Intuitively, an unselfish individual may be
better equipped to figure out whether stakes are so high that even the unselfish agents may be tempted
to cheat.
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2.2 Information and beliefs
Following Dawes (1989), we consider an information structure where Bayesian learning
leads to a consensus effect. We assume that it is common knowledge that all individuals
(both principals and agents) are drawn from the same population, a continuum of size
one. It is also common knowledge that the population contains both type U and type O
individuals. However, the precise share of each type is unknown. This implies that, by
looking at her own type, a principal can gather useful information about the likelihood
that others (including the agent with whom she will be matched) are unselfish.
Formally, we denote with pi the share of type U in the population (so that 1 − pi is
the share of type O). Individuals have a common prior over pi characterized by a non-
degenerate cumulative distribution F (pi) and a density f(pi) with support P ⊆ [0, 1]. In
addition to the prior, a principal has two pieces of relevant information: she observes a
noisy signal x ∈ X about pi and her own type τ ∈ {U,O}. The signal x captures the
information that she is able to collect about the composition of the general population.
Conditional on pi, x has density g(x|pi) and cumulative G(x|pi), which are both continuous
in pi. We denote with E(pi|x) the expected value of pi given the prior F and a realization
x, and with V ar(pi|x) the conditional variance (assumed positive for all x ∈ X). Notice
that the signal x does not convey any agent-specific information. Our framework thus
retains the assumption that preferences are unobservable. We will refer to the signal x as
objective evidence in order to distinguish it from the type-dependent information that is
generated by the observation of one’s own type.
The timing of the stage game is as follows,
1. Nature matches each principal with an agent.
2. Players observe their own type τ . The principal also observes x ∈ X.
3. The principal chooses p or np.
4. The agent observes the principal’s action and chooses c or nc.
5. Payoffs are realized.
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2.3 The evolutionary process
Each generation is born with a share pi of type U . Half of the population is randomly
assigned to the role of principal and half to the role of agent. Individuals then play the
stage game described above. After payoffs are obtained, a new generation (with possibly
a different pi) is born and its members are matched to play the game.
In order to pin down the long run distribution of preferences, we will focus on popula-
tions that are asymptotically stable under payoff monotone dynamics (see Samuelson and
Zhang, 1992). This is a class of evolutionary dynamics comprising the standard replicator
dynamics as a special case. Denote with Vτ (pi) the average material payoff (across both
roles) of type τ ∈ {U,O} given a share pi of type U in the population. Under payoff
monotone dynamics, pi increases whenever VU(pi) > VO(pi) and decreases when the reverse
inequality holds. Notice that, since type τ ’s overall fitness is determined by the payoffs of
both principals and agents, adaptation in our model works at the population level rather
than at the role level.10 The notion of asymptotic stability (see e.g. Weibull, 1997) reduces
in our setting to the standard conditions
1. (Monomorphic populations) pi = 1 (pi = 0) is asymptotically stable if, for all  > 0
sufficiently small, VU(1− ) > VO(1− ) (VO() > VU())
2. (Polymorphic populations) an interior stationary point pi ∈ (0, 1) (i.e. such that
VU(pi) = VO(pi)) is asymptotically stable if d(VU(z)− VO(z))/dz|z=pi < 0
A monomorphism occurs if the population is entirely composed of individuals with
one trait. Stability requires that rare mutants obtain lower fitness than the incumbent
trait. A polymorphism arises when the two traits coexist (pi ∈ (0, 1)). In this case, both
traits must have the same fitness and, after a small shock, the share of type U must revert
to pi.
In order to complete the description of the evolutionary process, we need to give an
account of how beliefs change over time. As noted by relevant literature (see Robson and
Samuelson, 2010, and Samuelson and Swinkels, 2006), it seems implausible that evolution
could endow individuals with perfect priors. Once we accept that individuals are born
10Alternatively, we could have assumed that each individual is simultaneously involved in two inter-
actions, playing in the role of principal in one and in the role of agent in the other. For instance, when
someone buys a new house he is both a seller (for the old house) and a buyer (for the new house).
9
with imperfect information, we need to specify a mechanism through which beliefs about
pi adjust to changes in the actual value of pi. There are two alternative ways to do
this. The first would consist in assuming that individuals are born with a prior F which
directly depends on the current value of pi. This approach is however problematic since
it implies that individuals need to know pi (a parameter of the prior distribution) in
order to estimate pi. The second route, which we take, consists in specifying an indirect
mechanism through which beliefs depend on the current value of pi. Under this approach,
individuals are born with the same prior F in every period but try to estimate pi using
the data available to them (i.e. the realization of the signal x and their own type).
Notice that the fact that the in-built prior does not change with the actual value of pi
is merely semantic. One can always reinterpret the posterior distribution of pi given x
as the “relevant prior information” of the individual (i.e. all the information that is not
generated by introspection). Since the distribution of x depends on the actual value of
pi, the distribution of (relevant) prior beliefs in the population depends stochastically on
the actual share of unselfish individuals in the population.
2.4 Discussion
A central theme of our theory is that, through the consensus effect, the beliefs of indi-
viduals acting as principals depend on their social preferences. This induces correlation
between the propensity to behave honestly and the propensity to participate. Hence, these
propensities evolve together. In the standard (direct) evolutionary approach, evolution
acts directly on behavior and a type is fully characterized by its strategy. Preferences and
beliefs are redundant, so that there is no role for a consensus effect. Our analysis instead
relies on the indirect evolutionary approach pioneered by Gu¨th and Yaari (1992).11 Under
this approach, individuals (who can be Opportunists or Unselfish) select their behavior
rationally given their preferences and the beliefs associated (via the consensus effect) with
their preferences. In other words, we assume that individuals are not pre-programmed
to adopt a certain behavior and rule out the possibility that evolution could somehow
11The evolution of preferences literature can be traced back to the work of Frank (1987). More recent
contributions include, among others, Bester and Gu¨th (1998), Huck and Oechssler (1999), Bisin and
Verdier (2001), Samuelson (2004), and Samuelson and Swinkels (2006), Dekel et al. (2007), Alger and
Weibull (forthcoming).
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“hardwire” the optimal behavior, thus making the beliefs of the individual irrelevant.12
A key feature of our model sets it apart from most of the literature on the evolution of
preferences. With a few exceptions (Huck and Oechssler, 1998, Gamba, 2013), most indi-
rect evolutionary analyses assume that preferences are observable. Unselfish preferences
are thus adaptive because they can affect the behavior of other players. This stands in
contrast with our model, where one’s preferences are private information. In our setting,
unselfish preferences are adaptive because they shape the beliefs of the decision maker,
thus affecting the decision maker’s own behavior.13
3 Equilibrium play in the stage game
The mechanism whereby Bayesian learning generates a consensus effect hinges on the
information conveyed by the observation of one’s own type. In spite of the fact that
individuals start with a common prior, posterior beliefs are type dependent. Formally,
denote with b(x, τP ) ≡ Pr(τA = U |x, τP ) the probability assessment that the agent is of
type U made by a type τp principal who observes a signal realization x.
Lemma 1. (The consensus effect) Given the same objective evidence, an unselfish princi-
pal assigns higher probability than an opportunistic principal to the agent being unselfish,
i.e.
b(x, U) = E(pi|x) + V ar(pi|x)
E(pi|x) > b(x,O) = E(pi|x)−
V ar(pi|x)
1− E(pi|x) , ∀x ∈ X. (1)
Proof. See Appendix.
The Lemma shows that, for any given value of x, the principal believes the agent to
be unselfish with higher probability when she is herself unselfish. Individuals thus project
their own characteristics onto others.
Consider now equilibrium play. A strategy for the principal maps her information
{U,O}×X into a distribution over {p, np}. A strategy for the agent maps {U,O}×{p, np}
into a distribution over {c, nc}. It is easy to verify that any sequential equilibrium of the
game is such that type O agents play c whenever the principal participates. By contrast,
since type U are altruistic and θ + α > ρ, type U agents play nc. Type O agents thus
12The working paper version provides a brief discussion of why it may not be a good idea to hardwire
trusting behavior.
13We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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enjoy an expropriation advantage since, by cheating, they maximize their material welfare,
whereas type U “leave money on the table”.
Consider now participation decisions.
Proposition 1. Given the same objective evidence, the difference in the expected utility
from participation between a type U and a type O principal is
(θ + α)
V ar(pi|x)
E(pi|x)(1− E(pi|x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
consensus effect
+ ρ
(
1− E(pi|x)− V ar(pi|x)
E(pi|x)
)
+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
altruism
> 0. (2)
Proof. See Appendix.
Hence, type U principals have a higher propensity to participate than type O. As
expression (2) suggests, there are two forces pushing in the same direction. First, the
consensus effect implies that type U principals are more optimistic about the chances
to be matched with a pro-social agent. This is captured by the first term in (2). The
ratio V ar(pi|x)/ [E(pi|x)(1− E(pi|x))] has a natural interpretation. The numerator is a
measure of the accuracy of objective evidence, x. The denominator is a measure of the
accuracy of the other signal available to an individual, namely her type τ .14 Overall, the
higher the ratio, the more individuals will rely on introspection and thus the stronger the
consensus effect. The second effect is a byproduct of altruism. Type U internalize their
agent’s material welfare when choosing whether to participate, while type O do not. This
makes participation more attractive to type U . It is however worth emphasizing that the
second effect is not crucial for our analysis. In the working paper version of this article we
show that all our results carry through when we assume away all concerns for the agent’s
welfare by type U principals.
3.1 Coarse information
We now provide a detailed illustration of the consensus effect and its implications for
participation for the simple case where the signal x is coarse. This case will be used
extensively in the rest of the paper. Suppose that x can only take two values, i.e. X =
{1, 0} and that the probability of receiving the high signal is g(x = 1|pi) = pi for all
realizations of τ ∈ {U,O}. Given the information structure, the signals x and τ are
14Using the law of total variance, it is easy to show that the denominator is equal to V ar(τ | x), where
τ is a random variable taking value 1 if τ = U and zero otherwise.
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Conditional moments
E(pi|x = 1) = E(pi|τ = U) = Π2
Π1
E(pi|x = 0) = E(pi|τ = O) = Π1−Π2
1−Π1
V ar(pi|x = 1) = V ar(pi|τ = U) = Π1Π3−Π22
Π21
V ar(pi|x = 0) = V ar(pi|τ = O) = Π2(1−Π2)−Π3(1−Π1)+Π1Π2−Π21
(1−Π1)2
Table 1: Conditional moments of pi.
identically and independently distributed conditional on pi. The conditional moments of
pi given either signal (x or τ) are reported for reference in Table 1, where Πn ≡ E(pin) is
the n-th moment about the origin of the prior F (pi).
Lemma 1 implies that
b(1, U) =
Π3
Π2
> b(1, O) = b(0, U) =
Π2 − Π3
Π1 − Π2 > b(0, O) =
Π1 − 2Π2 + Π3
1− 2Π1 + Π2 . (3)
To see how this translates into behavior, suppose further that the prior F (pi) is uniform
in (0, 1), so that Π1 = 1/2, Π2 = 1/3, and Π3 = 1/4. Figure 2 depicts, for all values of
θ, the locus of values for the probability that the agent is of type U that make a type
τ principal indifferent between participating and not participating. A type τ principal
observing the signal x will participate whenever b(x, τ) lies above the curve. Since type
U principals internalize the welfare of their agents, their indifference locus lies below that
of type O.
For θ sufficiently low, no participation occurs. As θ increases, type U observing the
high signal choose to participate. Further increases in θ induce first type U principals
with a low signal and then type O with a high signal to trust. Finally, for θ sufficiently
large, all participate. Notice that, except for the extreme cases of full participation or no
participation, the equilibrium participation rate depends on the actual share of unselfish
individuals pi. This happens for two reasons. First, type U are ceteris paribus more willing
to participate. Second, the share of principals (of both types) observing the high signal
realization depends on pi.
4 The long run distribution of preferences
In this Section, we endogenize the share pi of unselfish individuals and analyze populations
that are asymptotically stable under payoff monotone dynamics.
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type O with x = 1
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b(0, O)
b(1, O) = b(0, U)
b(1, U)
1
U ’s indifference locus
O’s indifference locus
Figure 2: Participation decisions with uniform prior and binary signal.
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Let Xτ ⊆ X denote the set of realizations of x for which type τ chooses to participate.
A type τ principal observing x ∈ Xτ will participate and obtain θ with probability pi and
−α otherwise. The same individual observing x /∈ Xτ will choose not to participate and
will obtain zero for sure. As agents, type U individuals obtain a material payoff equal to
one whenever trusted, so that the total average fitness of type U is
VU(pi) =
1
2
G(XU , pi)[pi(θ + α)− α] + 1
2
[
piG(XU , pi) + (1− pi)G(XO, pi)] , (4)
where G(Xτ , pi) ≡ ∫
x∈Xτ dG(x|pi) represents the fraction of type τ ∈ {U,O} individuals
who choose to participate given the actual share of unselfish individuals pi. The last term
in brackets is thus the probability of being matched, as an agent, with a principal who
participates. The average fitness of type O is instead
VO(pi) =
1
2
G(XO, pi)[pi(θ + α)− α] + 1
2
(1 + ρ)
[
piG(XU , pi) + (1− pi)G(XO, pi)] . (5)
We can then write the relative fitness (i.e. the difference between type U ’s and type O’s
average fitness) as a function of the actual share of unselfish individuals in the population,
VU(pi)− VO(pi) = 1
2
(G(XU , pi)− G(XO, pi)) (pi(θ + α− ρ)− α)− 1
2
G(XO, pi)ρ. (6)
If participation decisions are identical – namely, XU = XO – then the first term
in (6) is zero. In this case, relative fitness is (weakly) negative for all pi, owing to the
Opportunists’ expropriation advantage. The only candidate for asymptotic stability is
thus a population entirely composed of Opportunists. However, participation decisions
need not be the same. We know from Proposition 1 that unselfish individuals have a
higher propensity to participate, i.e. XO ⊆ XU . If pi(θ + α− ρ) > α, then the first term
of (6) is (weakly) positive. The sign of (6) is thus ambiguous and may change depending
on pi. This suggests that there may exist stable populations with a positive fraction of
type U . We now provide a full characterization of the stable populations for the case of
coarse information.
4.1 Stable populations with coarse information
The simple case of a binary signal x ∈ X = {0, 1} introduced in Section 3.1 allows for
a full characterization of the stable equilibria. We refer to the working paper version for
the general case of a signal with n ≥ 2 of realizations. All proofs for this subsection are
15
special cases of the slightly more general proofs given in Section 8.3 of the Appendix, and
are therefore omitted.
If the population is entirely composed of Opportunists, participating is clearly sub-
optimal. Since greater propensity to participate is the only potential advantage of the
Unselfish over the Opportunists, a population of Opportunists cannot be invaded. For-
mally, suppose that Π2 and Π3 in (3) are such that
b(1, U) ≥ α− 1− ρ
θ + α− ρ. (7)
Proposition 2. When objective evidence is coarse, pi = 0 is asymptotically stable iff (7)
holds.
Condition (7) ensures that type U would be willing to participate when observing the
high signal. Since participation is suboptimal when the fraction of type U is sufficiently
small, rare type U “mutants” have strictly lower average fitness than the incumbent type
O. If condition (7) is violated, no one participates and both traits have identical fitness.
In this case, pi = 0 is neutrally stable but not asymptotically stable.
The next result provides necessary and sufficient conditions for an asymptotically
stable polymorphic population where Unselfish and Opportunists coexist. Consider the
following restrictions on material payoffs
θ + α
ρ
> 2, (8)
θ − 2
√
ρ(θ + α− ρ) > 0, (9)
and suppose that Π1, Π2, and Π3 in (3) are such that
b(0, O) <
α
θ + α
≤ b(1, O). (10)
Proposition 3. When objective evidence is coarse, conditions (8), (9), and (10) are nec-
essary and sufficient for the existence of an asymptotically stable polymorphic population.
Under these conditions the stable share of type U is
pi∗ ≡ 1
2
+
α− ρ+ ∆
2(θ + α− ρ) ∈ (0, 1), (11)
where ∆ ≡√θ2 − 4ρ(θ + α− ρ).
Proposition 3 shows that, in the long run, different preferences may persist in the
population. In order to gather intuition on how the polymorphic equilibrium may arise,
16
note that condition (10) ensures that type O principals participate only when they observe
x = 1, while type U , who tend to be more optimistic, participate even when x = 0.
Consider now what happens when pi increases. This affects relative fitness in three ways.
First, an increase in the share of unselfish principals means that the Opportunists are more
likely to find gullible “victims” to expropriate. This reduces relative fitness. Second, an
increase in pi reduces the likelihood of being cheated. This benefits type U principals (who
are more likely to participate) more than type O principals. This effect, which we call
participation effect, generally increases relative fitness, thus inducing complementarity in
unselfish preferences. The third effect is purely informational. An increase in pi makes
the high signal more common, thus increasing participation by the Opportunists. This
weakens the participation effect. If pi is large, so that participation is optimal, relative
fitness is accordingly reduced.15
| | pi
0 1
pˆi
|
pi∗
|
| |
| |
Large benefits from participation
Strong participation effect
VU (pi)− VO(pi) < 0 > 0 < 0
Figure 3: Stable polymorphic population.
The interplay of complementarities and substitutabilities generated by these three ef-
fects may generate a stable polymorphic population. This is illustrated in Figure 3. Below
a critical value pˆi, relative fitness is negative. In this case, the expropriation advantage
is the dominant effect. Moreover, when pi is low, participation is suboptimal, so that
unselfish principals are actually hurt by their higher propensity to participate. Relative
fitness is also negative above the stable equilibrium pi∗. Although participating is opti-
mal in this case, most of the Opportunists observe the high signal. As a result, most
Opportunists participate and the participation effect is weak. Moreover, further increases
in pi tend to favor the Opportunists more than the Unselfish. For intermediate values of
pi ∈ (pˆi, pi∗), the expected benefits from participation are sufficiently large and the partic-
15However, note that if pi is low, an increase in the share of Opportunists who participate may actually
increase relative fitness.
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ipation effect is sufficiently strong to offset the expropriation advantage. Relative fitness
is accordingly positive. It is then immediate to see why pi∗ is stable: Type U have higher
fitness than type O for values of pi immediately below pi∗, while the reverse happens for
values immediately above pi∗. The existence of a range of values for pi such that relative
fitness is positive is ensured by conditions (8) and (9).16
Consider now the intuition for why α/(θ+α) has to belong to the interval (b(0, O), b(1, O)]
(condition 10). If α/(θ + α) ≤ b(0, O), then even the Opportunists who observe the low
signal x = 0 are willing to participate. As a result, there is no participation effect. If
α/(θ+α) > b(1, O), then type O never participate. In this case, the expropriation advan-
tage is the dominant effect for low values of pi, while the participation effect dominates
for sufficiently large values of pi. As a result, any interior stationary point where the two
effects offset each other is unstable.17
We now provide a simple numerical example of a polymorphic equilibrium.
Example Consider the example presented in Section 3.1 with uniform prior. Given a
uniform prior, b(0, O) = 1/4 and b(1, 0) = 1/2. Hence, for (10) to be satisfied, the ratio
θ/α must be between 1 and 3. If this holds, type O participate only when observing
the high signal, while type U always participate. Assume then the following parameter
values: θ = 5, α = 2, and ρ = 1. It is immediate to check that conditions (8-9) hold, so
that there is a stable polymorphic population where the share of type U is pi∗ = 2/3, i.e.
two thirds of the population are unselfish, with a third of Opportunists. Given pi∗ = 2/3,
the average payoff in the population is 1.7.18
16The requirement (θ + α)/ρ > 2 in (8) can be equivalently rewritten as θ + α − ρ > ρ. The term
θ+α− ρ, which appears both in (8) and in (9), represents the joint net surplus created by not cheating.
Inspection of (8) thus suggests that type U only survive when the net externality given to principals by
type U agents is large enough. However, (9) points to a countervailing effect. Since type U principals
benefit relatively more from the externality and given that fitness must be identical for both types, a
larger θ + α − ρ must be offset in equilibrium by a higher probability to be cheated (i.e. a lower pi∗).
However, through the information channel, a drop in pi∗ inhibits participation by type O. If the net
externality becomes too large, a drop in pi∗ further widens the gap between type U ’s and type O’s fitness,
thus making any interior stationary point unstable.
17In this case, a monomorphic population of type U may be stable. See below.
18The average payoff is given by
1
2
[pi∗ + pi∗(1− pi∗)][θpi∗ − α(1− pi∗) + ρ(1− pi∗) + 1],
where pi∗+pi∗(1−pi∗) = 0.8 is the share of the population who participate, θpi∗ = 3.3 is the average payoff
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Finally, for given configurations of the parameters, there also exist stable monomor-
phic populations entirely composed of unselfish. It is straightforward to verify that this
happens whenever b(1, O) < α/(θ + α) ≤ b(1, U) and θ > ρ. These equilibria do not
appear particularly plausible, though. They occur when the consensus effect is so strong
that a rare type O mutant in a population entirely composed of unselfish individuals
would use introspection and choose not to trust even when objective evidence suggests
otherwise.19
5 Implications for punishment and prevention
We consider here an extension where, in a fraction φ ∈ (0, 1) of interactions, cheaters are
detected and punished, i.e. rather than obtaining 1 + ρ > 0, a cheater receives a material
payoff 1− λ, with λ > 0. We will use two polar cases to fix ideas on the roles performed
by punishment. In the first, potential cheaters are perfectly able to anticipate punishment
and will not cheat unless they are sure that they can get away with it. In this case, no
actual punishment is enforced in equilibrium, so that punishment only takes the form of
deterrence. In the second case, potential cheaters cannot anticipate whether they will
face punishment for their misbehavior and retain the incentive to cheat in all interactions
(provided λ is not too large). As a result, punishment is ineffective as deterrent and only
takes the form of ex-post retribution.
Deterrence Suppose then that agents know whether they will be punished or not in
case of misbehavior. If principals could also perfectly anticipate punishment, then it is
easy to show that deterrence would have no consequence on the long run distribution of
preferences.20 We therefore focus on the more realistic case where, at the time the trusting
decision is taken, the principal is imperfectly informed. In particular, he does not know
whether a cheating agent would be punished or not, he only knows that opportunistic
from participating, ρ(1− pi∗) = 0.3 is the average payoff from cheating times the share of the population
who cheat, and α(1 − pi∗) = 0.6 is the loss from being cheated times the proportion of participating
principals who are cheated.
19In the working paper version of this manuscript, we discuss these equilibria more extensively. We also
argue that they disappear if we endogenize the weight that individuals assign to introspection vis-a´-vis
objective evidence when forming their posterior beliefs.
20Intuitively, in the fraction φ of interactions where punishment could be enforced, social preferences
play no role. In the rest of the interactions, the problem would be identical to the case of no punishment.
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agents cheat with probability 1− φ. The case where φ = 0 corresponds to the scenario of
no enforcement analyzed above. Denote with R(τ ;φ) the critical value of the probability
that the agent is of type U which makes a type τ principal indifferent between participating
and staying out. This is given by21
R(τ ;φ) ≡

(1−φ)α−φθ
(1−φ)(θ+α) τ = O
(1−φ)(α−ρ)−1−φθ
(1−φ)(θ+α−ρ) τ = U
. (12)
Similar to the case of no punishment, R(U ;φ) < R(O;φ) for all φ. i.e. type U are
ceteris paribus more willing to participate. Notice also that R(τ ;φ) is strictly decreasing
in φ. As one would expect, better enforcement increases the propensity to participate of
both types. In the short term, deterrence thus raises aggregate material welfare both by
reducing the scope for cheating and by encouraging participation.
On the other hand, deterrence makes participation decisions less type-dependent. Sim-
ple algebra shows that the first term in (2) becomes
(1− φ)(θ + α) V ar(pi|x)
E(pi|x)(1− E(pi|x)) . (13)
Compared to (2), a positive φ thus reduces the importance of the consensus effect for
participation decisions. Intuitively, as enforcement becomes more effective, one’s expec-
tations about her counterparty’s type become less important for the decision of whether
to participate – since dishonest behavior may be prevented even if one has the misfortune
of being paired with an opportunistic agent.
In order to understand what this implies for the long term distribution of preferences,
we provide a graphical illustration of the complex interaction between deterrence and the
share of type U . Details are provided in the Appendix.22
Figure 4 shows the relationships between φ and the stable share of type U (top part),
and between φ and material welfare (bottom part). Starting from φ = 0 and with a
21The expected utility from participation for a type τ individual observing signal x is
E(w|x,O) = (θ + α)[b(x,O)(1− φ) + φ]− α,
E(w|x, U) = (θ + α− ρ)[b(x, U)(1− φ) + φ] + ρ+ 1− α.
Setting the above equal to zero and solving for the b terms yields R(τ ;φ).
22In particular, Section 8.3 provides a generalization of Propositions 2 and 3 for the case φ ≥ 0. There,
we also make precise the conditions under which deterrence may crowd in or crowd out other regarding
preferences.
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set of parameters which induce pi = 0 as the unique stable equilibrium, an increase in φ
makes participation more profitable and reduces type O’s expropriation advantage. This
has two effects. First, by increasing type U ’s fitness vis-a`-vis type O’s, a higher φ makes
a polymorphic equilibrium viable.23 Second, a higher φ implies a higher equilibrium
share of type U . The intuition for this result is that, since the two types must have
the same fitness in equilibrium, the equilibrium proportion of type O who participate
must increase to compensate for the lower expropriation advantage. For this to happen,
a higher proportion of type O must observe the high signal, so that the share of type U
needs to increase accordingly.
However, closer inspection of Figure 4 reveals that there is also another, more subtle
effect at work. As φ increases further – so that it exceeds another threshold given by the
indifference condition for type O principals with x = 0, R(O;φ) = b(0, O) – the unique
stable population is again pi = 0. More effective deterrence may thus have a crowding out
effect. Intuitively, when there is little deterrence, only the Opportunists who observe the
high signal realization choose to participate (while all the Unselfish participate). A poly-
morphic equilibrium is thus possible. By contrast, when deterrence is more widespread,
the Opportunists observing the low signal also choose to participate. Since the Oppor-
tunists are now as likely to participate as the Unselfish, no stable polymorphic population
exists. In the working paper, we present parameter values such that better enforcement,
by eliminating the polymorphic equilibrium, ultimately leads to lower welfare.
Retribution Consider now the other extreme, in which agents are unable to anticipate
punishment and deterrence is absent. How does retribution affect payoffs? In our model,
the effect of retribution is essentially that of reducing the expected payoff achieved by
cheating. Define ρ˜ ≡ (1 − φ)ρ − φλ as the expected net return from cheating when the
agent only knows that cheating will be punished with probability φ. In order to focus on
pure retribution, we assume that φ ∈ [0, ρ/(ρ + λ)], so that ρ˜ ≥ 0. If ρ˜ were negative,
then cheating would become unprofitable and thus no cheating would occur, i.e. we would
have achieved full deterrence. It is clear that, once ρ is replaced with ρ˜, the model with
23For parameter values, a stable polymorphic equilibrium is only possible if φ is above a certain thresh-
old. This is implicitly given by the value of φ, φ∗, satisfying,
R(O;φ∗) =
θ + α− 2√ρ(θ + α− ρ)
θ + α
,
As shown in the Appendix, φ ≥ max{φ∗, 0} is necessary for a stable polymorphic equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Share of type U and average welfare as a function of φ.
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retribution is isomorphic to the one seen in the previous sections. As long as ρ˜ stays
positive, an increase in φ always reduces welfare in the short run. That is, the cheaters
obtain on average a lower payoff, whilst the payoff of the others remain unaffected. On the
other hand, in the long run, a lower ρ˜ makes the necessary conditions for a polymorphic
equilibrium (8) and (9) easier to satisfy. Moreover, the share of unselfish individuals in
the polymorphic equilibrium is strictly increasing in ρ˜. This suggests that retribution
may have positive effects on the distribution of preferences in the long run. Different
from the case of deterrence, however, crowding out is not possible. This is because, by
construction, retribution does not affect participation decisions.
To sum up, while deterrence increases welfare in the short term (when the distribution
of types is fixed), it has ambiguous effects in the long run. This is because, as we have
shown, deterrence weakens the participation effect. In turn, this may crowd out other
regarding preferences, leading over time to more cheating and lower welfare.24 Retribution
has a somewhat opposite effects. While it is always wasteful in the short run, it induces
a more desirable distribution of preferences in the long run.
6 Robustness and extensions
In the working paper version of this paper, we extend the model in the following directions
1. we consider the case where the principal, prior to her decision, can sample a number
n of individuals and observe their preferences, so that the signal x takes a finite
number n of realizations;
2. we consider other regarding preferences different from altruism;
3. we allow for individuals who are not constrained by Bayes rule over the weight to
give to introspection via-a`-vis objective evidence when forming their beliefs.
In relation to 1, we find that, given any finite n, there exist parameters that support a
polymorphic equilibrium. However, the set of suitable parameters tend to shrink in size
as n becomes larger. Regarding point 2, we show that altruism is not crucial for our
findings. In particular, we obtain identical results with reciprocity. We also show that
24Bohnet, Frey and Huck (2001) provide evidence of better enforcement crowding out trustworthiness.
Their concept of enforcement has both elements of deterrence and retribution.
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the same results apply even when type U individuals have selfish preferences when acting
as principals, so that the participation effect is purely driven by introspection. As for
point 3, we argue that allowing evolution to shape the way in which individuals combine
different sources of information would eliminate any monomorphic equilibrium where the
population is entirely composed of type U . Polymorphic equilibria are however robust to
the introduction of these mutants.
7 Empirical evidence and concluding remarks
Our work builds on the consensus effect to derive implications for the relative material
gains of opportunistic and unselfish individuals. The importance of the consensus ef-
fect for trust is amply documented in the experimental literature.25 We focus here on
the implications of our theory for the long run distribution of social preferences. In our
model, one’s propensity to trust is determined by his trustworthiness. Trustworthiness
and opportunism are then passed on to future generations under payoff monotonic dy-
namics. A possible interpretation of our model is thus that trustworthiness is genetically
determined and the most successful trait produces a larger number of surviving offspring.
An alternative interpretation is that youngsters have a propensity to adopt the cultural
traits of successful individuals of the previous generation. Under both interpretations, a
key prediction of our model is thus that trustworthy individuals can be as successful as
the opportunists. Butler et al. (forthcoming) present evidence that supports this hypoth-
esis. In a trust game experiment (where individuals play in both roles), they show that
people who are untrustworthy as receivers tend to underestimate average trustworthiness
in the subjects’ pool, and this considerably lowers their earnings when acting as sender.
That is essentially what we have in mind: People who trust too little typically tend to
underinvest. For instance, a youngster who believes that the world is an unjust place
dominated by opportunists will be less inclined to invest in education (since he thinks
that his investment is unlikely to pay off). Similarly, why should an employee exert any
25Evidence includes Costa Gomez et al. (2010), Charness et al. (2011), Sapienza et al. (2013), Butler et
al. (forthcoming) in the trust game, Ellingsen et al. (2010) in both trust and dictator game, Ga¨chter et al.
(2010) in a sequential voluntary contribution game, Blanco et al. (2009, 2011) in a sequential prisoner’s
dilemma. Moreover, the consensus effect survives even after subjects are exposed to substantial learning
opportunities – as shown e.g. in Butler et al. (forthcoming).
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effort beyond the legally binding minimum if he thinks that, when the time comes, the
employer will promote his own buddies anyway? The notion that excessive mistrust can
have important economic consequences is backed by empirical evidence obtained with
survey data. Butler et al. (2014) document a hump-shaped relationship between trust
and earnings. People who trust too little (or too much) face worse economic outcomes.26
They also show that the economic loss connected with trusting too little can reach a
similar order of magnitude as the income premium associated with obtaining a college
degree. Overall, the data indicate that, while being more trusting increases the likelihood
of being cheated, the gains generated by trusting others when trust is honored are enough
to compensate for this.
In sum, trusting too little can be economically damaging. The evidence on the con-
sensus effect implies that excessive mistrust is more likely to arise in individuals who
are themselves unscrupulous. However, we have argued that there is a limit to how far
this can go. If trusting/investing becomes too much of a “no brainer”, this is likely to
be picked up even by opportunists, who will accordingly start to invest more and thus
catch up with the rest. We have shown that this mechanism may potentially account for
another stylized fact, namely the observed heterogeneity in social preferences, without
which the very notion of a consensus effect becomes meaningless.
Finally, although the results are presented within the context of a trust game, we
believe that our insights are more general and may apply to a rich set of sequential
social dilemmas and other regarding preferences. In particular, it is conceivable that our
key result (a stable mix of opportunistic and non-opportunistic individuals) would carry
on in the case of an ultimatum game where individuals may be either opportunists or
reciprocal. A similar conjecture can be made for the sequential public good game, the
control game, and the gift exchange game. Future work should be devoted to clarifying
these conjectures.
26By exploiting cross-country heterogeneity in trustworthiness, they are also able to show that the
relationship between trust and earnings cannot be explained by reverse causality. Indeed, in countries
with lower average trustworthiness, income peaks at lower levels of trust.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Denote with h(pi|x, τ) the posterior distribution of pi given both x and the principal’s type
τP = U,O. For a type U principal,
h(pi|x, τP = U) = pi g(x|pi)f(pi)∫
z∈P zg(x|z)dF (z)
=
pig˜(pi|x)
E(pi|x) , (14)
where g˜(pi|x) = g(x|pi)f(pi)/ ∫
z∈P g(x|z)dF (z) is the posterior when observing x but not
τP . Similarly, for a type O principal,
h(pi|x, τP = O) = (1− pi) g(x|pi)f(pi)∫
z∈P(1− z)g(x|z)dF (z)
=
(1− pi)g˜(pi|x)
1− E(pi|x) , (15)
The last two expressions show that the principal’s beliefs about pi depend on her own
type. Denote with G˜ the cumulative distribution associated with g˜, with τA the agent’s
type, and with b(x, τP ) ≡ Pr(τA = U |x, τP ) the probability assessment that the agent is
of type U made by a type τP principal. A type U principal believes that the agent is a
type U with probability
b(x, U) =
∫
pi∈P pi
2dG˜(pi|x)
E(pi|x) = E(pi|x) +
V ar(pi|x)
E(pi|x) . (16)
The same probability for a type O principal is
b(x,O) =
∫
pi∈P pi(1− pi)dG˜(pi|x)
1− E(pi|x) = E(pi|x)−
V ar(pi|x)
1− E(pi|x) . (17)

8.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The expected utility w from participation of a type τP = U,O principal with objective
evidence x is
E(w|x, τP = O) = b(x,O)[θ + α]− α (18)
E(w|x, τP = U) = b(x, U)[θ + α− ρ] + 1 + ρ− α. (19)
The difference is thus
E(w|x, τP = U)−E(w|x, τP = O) = [b(x, U)− b(x,O)](θ + α) + [1− b(x, U)]ρ+ 1. (20)
Using (1), this reduces to (2). All terms are clearly positive. 
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8.3 Stable populations with enforcement
In this section we provide proofs for a slightly more general statement of Propositions 2
and 3 of Section 2.4. In particular, the results are proved for all φ ≥ 0 for the case of
deterrence. (The case of retribution is a straightforward extension and is thus omitted).
Propositions 2 and 3 can accordingly be seen as special cases (for φ = 0) of Propositions 2B
and 3B proved below. We also formally provide conditions under which more deterrence
may crowd in or crowd out unselfish preferences.
As in Section 4, let Xτφ ⊆ X denote the set of realizations of x for which type τ chooses
to participate, i.e.
Xτφ = {x ∈ X : b(x, τ) ≥ R(τ ;φ)}, (21)
where R(τ ;φ) is given by (12). Relative fitness is now given by
2[VU(pi)− VO(pi)] =(G(XUφ , pi)− G(XOφ , pi)) (θ + α)(1− φ)(piθ + α− ρθ + α −R(O;φ)
)
− G(XOφ , pi)ρ(1− φ).(22)
As expression (3) shows, the actual values of the posterior b(x, τ) are pinned down by
the exogenously given prior. To avoid complicated expressions, we will thus directly state
all conditions in terms of posterior beliefs. Condition (7) generalizes into
b(1, U) ≥ R(U ;φ). (23)
Proposition 2 can be restated as
Proposition 2B. When objective evidence is coarse pi = 0 is asymptotically stable iff
(23) holds.
Proof. Consider a share  > 0 sufficiently small of type U . A fraction 1− of the population
observes x = 0 while a fraction  observes x = 1. Assume then b(1, U) ≥ R(U ;φ) so that all
type U observing the high signal participate. Since b(0, O) < b(1, O) = b(0, U) < b(1, U)
and R(U ;φ) < R(O;φ), the only relevant cases are those summarized in the following
table,
In case 1, the RHS of (22) reduces to −ρ(1− φ) < 0 for all pi, so that pi = 0 is stable.
In case 2, we have
2[VU()− VO()] = (1− )(θ + α)(1− φ)
(

θ + α− ρ
θ + α
−R(O;φ)
)
− ρ(1− φ), (24)
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Case XUφ X
O
φ
1 R(O;φ) ≤ b(0, O) {0, 1} {0, 1}
2 R(O;φ) ∈ (b(0, O), b(1, O)] {0, 1} {1}
3 R(O;φ) > b(1, O) ∧ R(U ;φ) ≤ b(1, O) {0, 1} ∅
4 R(O;φ) > b(1, O) ∧ R(U ;φ) > b(1, O) {1} ∅
which is negative for  sufficiently small. In case 3, relative fitness has the same sign as
the first term in (24) so that the same applies. Finally, in case 4,
2[VU()− VO()] = (θ + α)(1− φ)
(

θ + α− ρ
θ + α
−R(O;φ)
)
, (25)
which is again negative for  sufficiently small. Hence, R(U ;φ) ≤ b(1, U) is sufficient
for pi = 0 to be asymptotically stable. Clearly enough, when R(U ;φ) > b(1, U), no one
participates. Relative fitness is thus zero. This implies that R(U ;φ) ≤ b(1, U) is also
necessary.
As for Proposition 3, condition (8) (θ + α/ρ > 2) remains unchanged. Condition (9)
generalizes into
R(O;φ) <
θ + α− 2√ρ(θ + α− ρ)
θ + α
, (26)
and (10) becomes
b(0, O) < R(O;φ) ≤ b(1, O). (27)
Then,
Proposition 3B. When objective evidence is coarse, conditions (8), (26), and (27) are
necessary and sufficient for the existence of an asymptotically stable polymorphic popula-
tion. Under these conditions the stable share of type U is
pi∗ ≡ (θ + α)(1 +R(O;φ))− 2ρ+ ∆φ
2(θ + α− ρ) ∈ (0, 1), , (28)
where ∆φ ≡
√
(θ + α)2(1−R(O;φ))2 − 4ρ(θ + α− ρ).
Proof. We start off by showing that b(0, O) < R(O;φ) ≤ b(1, O) is necessary for a stable
polymorphic population. Suppose first that b(0, O) ≥ R(O;φ). This implies that all
individuals participate independently of their type or the signal x they observe. Since
XU = XO = {0, 1}, relative fitness (22) is strictly negative for all pi ∈ (0, 1). As a result,
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no stable polymorphic population exists. Suppose then that b(1, O) < R(O;φ). This
implies XO = ∅ so that type O never participate. Equation (22) thus becomes
2[VU(pi)− VO(pi)] = (θ + α)(1− φ)G(XU , pi)
[
pi
θ + α− ρ
θ + α
−R(O;φ)
]
, (29)
where G(XU , pi) is equal to one if XU = {0, 1}, is equal to pi if XU = {1}, and is equal
to zero if XU = ∅. Inspection of (29) shows that for all pi such that Vpi(T )− Vpi(O) = 0,
|z=pid(Vz(T )− Vz(O))/dz ≥ 0, so that no polymorphic population is stable.
Given b(0, O) < R(O;φ) ≤ b(1, O), XO = {1} and XU = {0, 1} (since b(1, U) ≥
b(0, U) = b(1, O)). Equation (22) thus becomes
2[VU(pi)− VO(pi)] = (1− pi)(θ + α)(1− φ)
(
pi
θ + α− ρ
θ + α
−R(O;φ)
)
− piρ(1− φ). (30)
Clearly enough, any stable polymorphic population, if there is any, is a root of the RHS
of (30) (although not all roots are necessarily stable populations). The next Lemma gives
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of real roots in the (0,1) interval.
Lemma 2. The RHS of (30) has real roots in (0, 1) if and only if θ + α > 2ρ and
R(O;φ) <
θ+α−2
√
ρ(θ+α−ρ)
θ+α
. The roots are pi∗ (as given by 28) and pˆi = pi∗−∆φ/(θ+α−ρ).
Both pi∗ and pˆi lie in the interval (R(O;φ), 1).
Inspection of (30) reveals that the RHS is an increasing-decreasing function taking
negative values for pi = 0 and pi = 1. If R(O;φ) ≥ (θ+α−ρ)/(θ+α), then VU(pi)−VO(pi) <
0 for all pi ∈ (0, 1) so that the RHS of (30) has no real root in (0, 1). However, if
R(O;φ) < (θ + α − ρ)/(θ + α) and √(θ + α)2(1−R(O;φ))2 − 4ρ(θ + α− ρ) > 0, then
the RHS of (30) has two real roots,
pˆi, pi∗ =
(θ + α)(1 +R(O;φ))− 2ρ±√(θ + α)2(1−R(O;φ))2 − 4ρ(θ + α− ρ)
2(θ + α− ρ) . (31)
of which the largest is pi∗ as given by (28). It is immediate to check that pˆi < pi∗ < 1,
and that pi∗ > pˆi > 0 requires R(O;φ) > (2ρ− θ − α)/(θ + α). To sum up, R(O;φ) must
satisfy
2ρ− θ − α
θ + α
< R(O;φ) < min
{
θ + α− 2√ρ(θ + α− ρ)
θ + α
,
θ + α− ρ
θ + α
}
. (32)
Notice that
2ρ− θ − α
θ + α
<
θ + α− 2√ρ(θ + α− ρ)
θ + α
(33)
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only if θ + α > 2ρ. Moreover, given a) R(O;φ) > 0 (since R(O;φ) > b(0, O) ≥ 0 by
assumption) and b) θ + α > 2ρ, the first inequality in (32) always holds and can be
ignored. Under θ + α > 2ρ we also have
θ + α− ρ
θ + α
>
θ + α− 2√ρ(θ + α− ρ)
θ + α
. (34)
Hence, R(O;φ) <
θ+α−2
√
ρ(θ+α−ρ)
θ+α
and θ+ α > 2ρ, are necessary and sufficient conditions
for the RHS of (30) to have two real roots in the interval (0, 1). Moreover θ + α > 2ρ⇒
pi∗ > pˆi > R(O;φ). This proves Lemma 2.
The proof of Proposition 3B is concluded by noticing that d(VU(z)−VO(z))/dz|z=pˆi ≥ 0
and d(VU(z)− VO(z))/dz|z=pi∗ < 0, so that pˆi is unstable and pi∗ is stable.
The crowding in and crowding out results immediately follow from Propositions 2B
and 3B.
Corollary 1 (crowding in)
a) Assume θ + α > 2ρ and consider two levels of enforcement φ′ and φ′′ with φ′′ > φ′.
Then, a positive fraction pi∗ of type U is possible under φ′′ but not under φ′ if
b(0, O) < R(O;φ′′) < min
{
b(1, O),
θ + α− 2√ρ(θ + α− ρ)
θ + α
}
< R(O;φ′). (35)
b) Consider two levels of enforcement φ′ and φ′′ with φ′′ > φ′. If conditions (8), (26), and
(27) are satisfied for both φ′ and φ′′, then the stable share of type U , pi∗, is larger under
φ′′ than under φ′.
Corollary 2 (crowding out) Assume θ > 2ρ and consider two levels of enforcement φ′
and φ′′ with φ′′ > φ′. Then, a positive fraction pi∗ of type U is possible under φ′ but not
under φ′′ if
R(O;φ′′) < b(0, O) < R(O;φ′) < min
{
b(1, O),
θ + α− 2√ρ(θ + α− ρ)
θ + α
}
. (36)
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